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THE DURATION AND TERMINATION OF AN OFFER.
ROFESSOR Williston has recently pointed out' the change
which the law of the formation of simple contracts underwent during the first century of its development. The change
is fundamental. Originally the courts thought of a simple contract
as involving an actual concurrence of the minds of the parties.
Gradually this conception was supplanted by the notion that the objective and not the subjective state of mind of the parties is controlling. Where the actual state of mind differs from the apparent
state of mind, the former must be ignored and, whenever they happen to be identical, it may be ignored without affecting the results
ordinarily. The courts in the main have abandoned the subjective
analysis and have adopted an objective one. Nevertheless, the
cases and text books abound in language, the use of which shows an
attempt to state results reached under the new analysis in the terminology of the old. Too frequently, too, the old analysis is employed. In either event, the result in some cases is decisions difficult to defend. There is need for a total abandonment of the old
terminology and for a consistent restatement of the law of contracts on the basis of the analysis now generally accepted and in its
terminology.
Most of the questions concerning the duration and termination
of an offer present no great difficulty and, to most of those which
have been considered, the cases have returned answers to which no
serious objection can be taken. The reasoning by which the courts
have reached these results and, especially, the language in which
they have expressed them are confusing and misleading in many
cases. In the occasional instances where the results reached seem
objectionable, a misleading analysis or use of words has obscured
considerations which should have prevailed.

p

THX MEANING

or

REvOCATION.

In connection with offer, the term, revocation, is usually employed
to express the idea of a reversal of purpose on the part of the offerer communicated to the offeree. The notion, that an uncommunicated change of mind is sufficient to destroy the offeree's
power to accept, which is found in some of the early cases has been
abandoned. It rested upon the assumption that an offerer's liabilities are determined by his actual state of mind rather than by the
state of mind apparent to the offeree. The opinion now generally held
£XIV
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is that the operative fact is the communication. The change of mind
is an immaterial circumstance although it is usually an attendant
one. It is better, therefore, to define revocation as the communication of a change in the offerer's purpose.
"Lapse of an offer" is quite commonly and very usefully employed to denote all the circumstances under which an offer will end in
the absence of a revocation by the offerer and a rejection by the
offeree.
These ideas, revocation and lapse, are relatively simple and occasion little difficulty. But there seems to be considerable obscurity as to the meaning of revocation in the well known case of Shuey
v. United States.2 In this case the difficulty concerns the distinction between the revocation and the lapse of an offer.
This case will be considered at some length in at attempt to show
that the result reached is as logically sound as it is practically judicious. Before undertaking an analysis of the case, it may be well
to refer to the discussion of this decision by some of the textwriters.
In the third American edition of Sir William R. Anson's Principles of the Law of Contracts edited by Professor Arthur L. Corbin, which has just appeared, there is repeated, p. 55, the following
statement which is found in earlier revisions:
"There is American authority for the view that the revocation of an offer made by advertisement need not be communicated to the offeree. As such an offer is made to the
whole world, it clearly can be revoked only in the way in
which it is made-by advertisement. See Shuey v. United
States, 92 U. S. 73."
So far as this statement is an approval of the result reached by
the court on the second ground upon which it put the case of Shuey
v. United States, it is not open to objection. However, a careful
analysis of this case will show that the'statement is inaccurately
phrased as a result of an unstudied use of words and discloses, it
is believed a misapprehension of the principle upon which the result
in that dase must rest. Morever, the statement as made is likely
to mislead.
2 9; U. S., 73. In April, i86s, the Secretary of War published in the newspapers
an offer of $25,000 for the apprehension of one Surratt, an accomplice of Booth. In
November, x86s, the President published a withdrawal of this offer. In April, x866, the
plaintiff's testator was in Italy and there gave information leading to Surratt's arrest,
mot knowing of the second publication. The Court held that the plaintiff could not recover the reward because his testator had not performed the act asked for and because
the offer had been "revoked" before he acted upon it. Only the second ground upon
which the case is put will be considered.
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The following appears in Professor Clarence D. Ashley's "The
Law of Contracts" p. 33, 34:
"In the case of Shuey v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court reached a conclusion which has been subjected to little criticism. The result of the case on the point
of revocation is stated at the end of the opinion. The Court
there says: 'True, it is found that. . .. he (i. e., the offeree)
was ignorant of the withdrawal; but that was an immaterial
fact. The offer of the reward not having been made to him
directly, but by means of a published proclamation, he should
have known that it could be revoked in the same manner in
which it was made.'
"In the first place, the manner in which the offer was made
was by communication. There was no offer to him until he
knew of it. If he ought to know that it could be revoked in
the same manner, he ought to know something the Court
seems not to know, namely, that it can be revoked in no other
manner.
"And again, why ought he to know that communication of
a revocation is not necessary? If he knows anything about
the law, he will be aware that the law as to revocation re,quires communication, and before this decision he would seem
to be justified in the assumption that the Supreme Court
would decide according to the rules of law. The Court was
possibly influenced by the fact that it might prove difficult to
revoke under such circumstances. But what of it? Such
may prove to be the case with any offer. The offerer ought
to think of this when he makes his offer.
"It is usually said that an offer does not bind the offerer,
and this is true in the sense that he may withdraw the offer
by taking proper and timely steps. But it is not true that an
offer plaes no responsibility upon him.
"Every one is responsible for his actions, and if he makes
an offer he must take the consequences. No matter what
diligence he may use in striving to recall such offer, it will
not avail unless he actually succeeds in doing what the law requires for a revocation. If after such endeavor he fails, the
offer which thus continues may be accepted, and a contract
arise in spite of the offerer's efforts. Thus if one makes an
offer to another, designating one year as the time it shall
"continue, and such offeree goes to the woods of Africa, it
may well happen that the offerer may be unable to communi-
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cate a change of mind, and a contract arise in spite of attempts to make known such change of intention."
The same confusion of thought and terms characterizes this quotation. The seriousness of this confusion is shown by its having
led Professor Ashley to disapprove the result reached.
Speaking of the same case, Sir Frederick Pollock says:
"The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
a general proposal made by public announcement may
be effectually revoked by an announcement of equal publicity, such as an advertisement in the same newspaper,
even as against a person who afterwards acts on the proposal
not knowing that it has been revoked. For 'he should have
known' it is said, 'that it could be revoked in the manner in
which it was made.' In other words, the proposal is treated
as subject to a tacit condition that it may be revoked by an
announcement made by the same means. This may be a
convenient rule, and may perhaps be supported as a fair inference of fact from the habits of the newspaper-reading
part of mankind;8 yet it seems a rather strong piece of judicial legislation."
This passage suggests the solution of the problem raised by this
case, but the rule does not involve the question as to what amounts
to a revocation of an offer in any ordinary meaning of the term.
Without attempting a complete'definition, an offer may be roughly
-described as an expression of an intention to act in a certain way
such
with reference to subject-matter of some social importance,
4
as induces in the mind of another a reasonable expectation that the
person act
-proposer will conduct himself as stated should the other
5
action.
that
invites
as
such
and
thereon,
reliance
in
An offer having been made will continue until it is ended by a
lapse or a revocation." The offerer may, by informing the offeree
of a change of mind, terminate the offer by thus destroying the expectation which his offer has aroused and for which he is responPoLLocx ot CoyRsAcTs, (Third Ed.) 23.
law
4 The sentence with which Sir Frederick Pollock opens his treatise on the
of
-of contracts is noteworthy. "The law of contract may be described as the endeavor
the State, a more or less imperfect one by the nature of the case, to establish a positive
sanction for the expectation of good faith which has grown up in the mutual dealings
-of men of average right-mindedness."
legal
5 An offer is here described in terms of the operative facts rather than their
as opposed
-consequences. Whether the operative facts are what the offerer said and did
to the state of mind of the offeree is not considered at this time, since the difference,
if any, does not affect the questions under discussion.
0 An offer is terminated also by a rejection. This is considered p. 2op.
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sible. There being no revocation, an offer will continue so long as
the reasonable expectation which has been aroused in the mind of
the offeree may reasonably continue; i. e., so long as the offerer has
led the offeree reasonably to believe that he will continue with a
like intention and determination. When that period of time ends,
the offer lapses. Obviously, it is not terminated by revocation.
.fThe duration of this expectation, in all cases, is purely a question
of fact. If the offer is accompanied by a statement that it is to remain open for a specified time, the answer to this question of fact
is clear.7 The offer remains open for the time specified because
that, as a matter of fact, is the scope of the expectation which has
been aroused. If the offerer says nothing as to how long the offer
8
is to remain open, its duration is still a question of fact and it is
the same question of fact. How long did the offerer lead the offeree to believe that he intended the offer to remain open? since
the offerer has not said, we conclude as a fact that he objectively
intended a reasonable time, not because we find him actually to bi
a reasonable man or, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presume him to be reasonable, but because we consider the effect of
his words and conduct upon the offeree. They being normal, usual
or reasonable, aroused in the mind of the offeree an expectation of
reasonable duration. The words and conduct being normal, as a
matter of ordinary human experience, the offeree could not reasonably conclude that the offerer intended an unreasonable time.9
It has been given as a reason why an offer in terms unlimited is
limited to a reasonable time that otherwise gret hardship would
result to the offerer in case he became unable to communicate a revocation to the offeree. This' reason does not account for an offer
remaining open until the lapse of a reasonable time. Moreover, it
is not believed that this is a circumstance because of which the law
imposes upon the parties the reasonable-time rule regardless of the
facts in a particialar case. It is merely one of the surrounding circumstances which, together with what the offerer said and did, we
I The effect of such a statement is not always negative. Pou.ocx, op. cit., 28. it
is affirmative if the period specified is longer than would be reasonable under the circumstances of the offer in question.
P The courts sometimes call it a question of law when all that is meant is that it
is a question for the judge and not for the jury. In the ordinary case, it is a question
for the jury. Although the other facts in the case ace not in dispute, it should be left
to the jury to say whether the attempted acceptance was within a reasonable time unless
the time is so long or short as to make a question about which men could not reasonably
differ.
' If the offeier is subjectively unreasonable but objectively reasonable, his actual
state of mind is of no legal consequence so far as the offere's power to accept and his
rights after acceptance are concerned.
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use in determining as a matter of fact the scope of the expectation
aroused by the offerer.
Regardless of the language used by the Court, the question involved in Shuey v. United States is as to the scope of the offer when
made. It is not a question of revocation at all if that term is used
with accuracy. If A makes an offer to B stating that it is to remain
open two weeks, B may not, by an acceptance after two weeks,
make a contract, because the offer, i. e., the reasonable expectation,
has ceased to exist. The expectation aroused by the offer was at
the outset qualified by a time contingency and that contingency has
Ihappened. So of an attempted acceptance after a reasonable time
if no time is specified. In neither case has there been a revocation.
The offers in these cases have lapsed. Suppose A makes an offer to
B, saying that it is to remain open for two weeks but is to end at
once if A's factory is destroyed by fire within the two weeks. Suppose the factory burns within the period limited and A, thereafter,
accepts, not knowing that it has burned. No contract arises, not
because the offer has been revoked, but because it has lapsed upon
the happening of this contingency. The contingency qualified the
expectation. When one reads an-offer of a reward in a newspaper,
the expectation aroused is similaily qualified. It is a matter of
common experience that,, after offers of this kind have been made in
this way, the offerers publish their change of mind in the same
manner. "As a fair inference of fact from the habits of the newspaper-reading part of mankind", it can be said that unless the expectation aroused by an offer of a reward so communicated is
10
Th
thus limited and qualified, it is not a reasonable expectation.
second publication does not need to be relied upon as a revocation.
The expectation is contingent and this publication is the contingency. Had the plaintiff in Shuey v. United States apprehended
Surratt at the time he gave the information leading to his apprehension, there would have been no contract since at that time there was
1
no offer because it had lapsed, not because it had been revoked. "
The word, revocation, is useful when limited to its true meaning.
It should be reserved to express the idea of a communication of a
change of mind on the part of the offerer. It is unnecessary to qualify
the general rule that an uncommunicated change of mind is inoperative in order to sustain the result in Shuey v. United States. It is
moreover, unfortunate to handle the case in terms of revocation beFor the same reason, the contingency has not happened unless the second publication is substantially as widespread as was the publication of the reward.
" The rule in this case seems to be a no stronger piece of judicial legislation than
is any logical application of a familiar principle.
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cause the apparent logical difficulties that result may lead to a condemnation of the rule. Certainly the rule is desirable. Rewards
are useful devices and their utility depends largely upon an ability
to make them effective as offers in a widespread fashion. Their use
would be restricted by a rule requiring actual communication of a
change of mind to all who chanced to hear of them. It is no answer to say, as Professor Ashley does, that this is what is required

in the case of an ordinary offer to an individual. In such a case,
the offerer ordinarily needs and wants to induce but a single person
to act.
CASUAL COMMUNICATION.

How recent the development of the law of simple contract is, is

shown by the number of elementary questions which have not come
up for decision or have been passed upon in too few cases to make
much generalizing possible. One of such questions is the legal
consequences of casual as opposed to direct communication in the
formation of contracts. This question is considered in Dickerson v.
Dodds.1 2 Even though this had been an action at law, the question
as to whether or not the hear-say information about the offerer's
later state of mind which the offeree received would terminate the
offer would not be raised until it were first determined whether or
not the fact that the offerer was offering to sell the same property to

another fairly indicated to the mind of the offeree a change in the
offerer's determination. It may have fairly led the offeree to
believe no more than that the offerer intended to sell to another if
he could do so upon better terms before the plaintiff, accepted. This
would not necessarily mean that he was no longer minded to sell
it to the offeree. But such information, at least, qualified the offeree's expectation by introducing the contingency of a sale to an1 2 Ch. Div., 463. On Wednesday, the defendant, Dodds, made an offer to the plaintiff for the sale of a dwelling house, which offer was to remain open until the following
Friday, 9 A. M. In the afternoon of Thursday, the plaintiff was informed by one
Berry that Dodds his been offering or agreeing to sell the property to the defendant,
Allan. Thereupon the plaintiff left a notice of acceptanie with a Mrs. Burgess, at whose
house Dodds was staying. It never reached him, she forgetting to give it to him. At
seven o'clock on Friday morning, the plaintiff's agent handed Dodds a duplicate of the
acceptance. Dodds then told the agent that he.had sold the property. A contract for
the sale of the property to the defendant, Allan, had been signed on Thursday. The
plaintiff sought specific performance and a decree by the Vice-Chancellor granting it was
reversed on the ground that there was no contract between the plaintiff and Dodds.
It is probably true that, under the facts in this case, the plaintiff was not entitled
to specific perforniance. In his bill, however, the plaintiff asked damages. Prior to the
Judicature Act, the court was not at liberty to award them when they were auxiliary to
the principal relief requested and the request for that relief was not well founded. It
would seem that the court had power under the Judicature Act to grant damages although
the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance. FaY, SPEcIFIc PI0oaseANcz (5th
Ed.), Sees. .3o5-6. This question was not considered in the case.
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other although unknown to the offeree if the mode of its communication was sufficient.
If in a given case what the offerer says or does fairly indicates
to the offeree that the offerer no longer intends to perform his offer,
there seems to be no sufficient reason to hold a casual communication of this fact any less effective as a revocation of the offer than
a direct communication. An offer continues no longer than the expectation aroused continues.13 If that expectation has been destroyed, there is no longer any offer so that how it was destroyed
14
would seem to be unimportant.
. The same principles should, it is believed, be applied to the rejection of an offer. An offerer should continue responsible for the
expectation which he has aroused until he ends that expectation or
until he is fairly informed that the offeree is not contemplating acting in reliance upon the offer. If the offerer in fact has learned that
the offeree is no longer considering the offer, it would seem unimportant whether he learned it directly from the offeree or through
third persons.
Should the same rule apply to .the casual communication of wilingness to contract? It seems not: The effect of a revocation and
a rejection is to prevent the formation of a- contract. The effect
of an offer and of an acceptance, however, may be the formation of
a contract. This difference is broad enough to justify, and serious
enough to indicate, definitions both of an offer and of an acceptance that would exclude casual communication. What authority
there is on this point indicates that the courts will make this distinction."

TME EFPECT O1 A COUNTER OFER.

It is commonly said that a counter-offer terminates a prior offer.
As a rule of thumb this is useful, but it is important to observe and
to keep in mind that it is merely a rule of thumb. A counter-offer
may or may not terminate a prior offer depending upon the facts in
the particular case. It usually does and does so for the same reason that an express rejection by the offeree usually ends an offer.
One by making an offer creates a situation having possible consequences for which he is responsible. He creates in the mind of the
"Is But an offer does continue as long as does the expectation.

This seems to be the
not when sent, but when received.
operative
is
revocation
a
that
rule
the
of
justification
4
i Corturight v. Hoogstoll, ros L. T., 628; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 2x; Frank
v. Stratford, 13 Wyo. 37.
I Benton v. Springfield Y. M. C. A., 17o Mass. 534; Peek v. Detroit Novelty Works,
29 Mich. 313. See Sears v. King Co. Elkv. Ry. Co., 152 Mass. 1s.
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offeree an expectation as to his future conduct and invites action 6
in reliance thereon. If the offeree expressly rejects the offer, he must
know that the possibility of his acting in reliance upon it will cease
to be a part of the offerer's calculations and the offerer is properly
held at liberty to make other arrangements. 17 So whether a counter-offer ends a prior offer depends upon whether, under the circumstances, the counter-offer fairly justifies the offerer in conluding that the offeree is no longer considering acting in reliance
upon the prior offer. In the ordinary case, a counter-offer does
fairly signify a brushing aside of the prior offer as the basis of a
business arrangement, but this may not be true in all cases. Suppose, in reply to an offer by A, B writes, "I shall want to consider
your offer for more of the time which you have allowed me for
that purpose because I am so situated now that I cannot return an
immediate" answer. However, the situation is such that if you want
to settle the matter at once, I will close with you now at 57 less
than the price you name." It seems clear that A could conclude a
contract by accepting the lower price, but this reply should not, under ordinary circumstances, be held to terminate the original offer.
Whether a counter-offer terminates a prior offer is, in all cases, a
question of fact to which this rule of thumb returns the correct
answer in most, but not in all of them.
Dos THn DEATH OV AN OVERZR TERmINATE AN OVVZR?
It is commonly stated by text-writers that the death of the offerer
terminates an offer. In none of the text-books does the question
seem to have been examined critically.
It seems clear that, where the offeree learns o'f the death of the
offerer before he has acted in reliance upon the expectation aroused
by the offer, he cannot bind the offerer's estate by a subsequent acceptance.
A wholly different case is that in which the offeree, not knowing
of the death of the offerer, performs the act constituting an acceptance whether that act is the giving of a counter-assurance or
1 This is true whether the conduct invited is a counter-assurance of what the of.
feree's conduct will be or some other action.
1?Does a rejection in the ordinary sense of that term always terminate an offer?
Suppose the offerer says when making the offer, 'I expect you tb reject this offer upon
first consideration, but I want you to consider it further, because I think you will accept
when you have thought about it a while." The offeree immediately sends a rejection
which the offerer ignores. On further thought, the offeree sends an acceptance. It is believed the courts would hold the offerer bound. He has been taken at his word. His objective will is decisive. Possibly it may be useful to confine the term, rejection, to a.
meaning more limited than its ordinary one.
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some other act. There are cases holding that even in this case
18
death terminates the offer.
It would be difficult to find a better example of the unfortunate
results that follow applying logical processes only to the solution
of practical problems. These cases are also a good example of the
persistence of the subjective analysis of the law of contracts. The
courts say that the reason the offer is terminated by the death of the
offerer is obvious. A contract cannot be made with a dead man. If
an actual concurrence of wills is necessary for the formation of a
contract, this is true, since in our law the persona of the deceabed
19 The
is not continued. But no concurrence of wills is necessary.
offerer by his offer aroused a reasonable expectation in the mind
of the offeree upon which, by hypothesis, he has reasonably acted.
As betweenjthe gratuitous takers of the offerer's property and the
offeree,'it is perfectly clear which should suffer the consequences
of the casualty of the offerer's death. It is no answer to say that the
offeree can, in a proper case, recover on principles of quasi contracts because what is now being examined is the merit of this rule
in the law of contracts. Moreover, recovery on a quasi contract
would not always cover all the impoverishment which the offeree
may have unjustly suffered, much less his reasonably anticipated
profits. The question is more acute concerning offers for unilateral than bi-lateral contracts, but there seems to be no sufficient reason why the same rule should not apply to both. There are cases
holding that the unknown death of the offerer does not terminate the
offer.20 An examination of authorities will probably show that this
3
'- Aitkens v. Lang, io6 Ky. 65z; Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168. Wallace v.
ground that the offeree
Townsend, 43 0. St. 537, is probably distinguishable on the
v. Davies, x2
knew of the death of the offerer when it accepted. Strange to say, Offord
State Bank v.
C. B., N. S., 748 has been cited as authority for this view. Michigan
Estate of Leavenworth, 28 Vt. 2o9, can rest on other grounds.
regardless of
Offers for contracts of a personal nature can hardly be said to survive
contract would be
whether there is or is"not knowledge of the death since a resulting
discharged by the death.
to find
"It is believed that one adopting a subjective analysis would be troubled
subsequent to death
grounds for holding a contract to have been formed by an acceptance
the offer.
when"the offerer had expressly stated that his death was not to terminate
2
a U. C. C. P.,
- 0Bradbury v. Morgair, 3x Law J. Exch. 462; Fennell v. McGuire,
I. R. 575; Coulthart v. Clemenson, s Q. B. D.
134. See also Dodd v. Whelan (7897),
8z Ala. 227; Davis v.
42; Harris v. Fawcett, L. M. 8 Chan. App, 866; Garrett v. Trabue,
Davis, 93 Ala. 173.
this question
Mr. Williston points out (XIV ILL. LAW REvIEw, 9) the bearing upon
of the holdings in cases of insanity.
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question is still fairly open for disposition in terms of a sound analysis and upon common sense considerations."'
The same considerations apply to the death of the principal in the
law of agency. In fact, the problems in the two situations can be
stated in identical logical terms. In both cases there is a power not
22
coupled with an interest. A great majority of the agency cases
,hold that the lack of knowledge of the death of the principal is immaterial in determining whether the power of the agent has been
terminated. 28 The explanations of this result given in the cases
are based upon a wholly abstract analysis and the result itself is an
unfortunate consequence of excessive ratiocination. The rule has
been much criticised and a few courts have held otherwise, following the rule of the civil law.
If it be useful to generalize further, it can be said in resume, that
most if not all the problems concerning the duration and termination of an offer can be reduced to the basic question of fact, "What
was the objective will of the offerer?" the obverse of which is,
"What, as a matter of fact, is the scope of the expectation reasonably attributable to the offeree ?-24
In considering the duration and termination of an offer the question may be put in either of these two ways without affecting the
result in most cases. There may be cases, however, where this is not
true. To say that the two are interchangeable in all cases involves
the assertion that the apparent and not the real state of mind of a
person is controlling not only where that person is denying contractual duties and liabilities but also where he is claiming contractual rights and powers. Whether or not the test is objective
or is not
21 As to the unknown death of the offeree, the question does not arise
acute concerning offqrs for unilateral contracts. Suppose an offer for a bi-lateral contract provides that the contract is not to arise at the posting, but only upon the receipt

of the letter or assent. The offeree posts his acceptance and dies before it is received.
His estate should be bound. There seem to be no cases in point. Northwestern Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Joseph, 3r. Ky. RO. 714 and Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 2o3 do

not involve this question.
22Arthur L. Corbin, 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL, x6g, s81 et seq.
' MFCHEm AGENCY, (and Ed.), Sections 664-667.
21A rule that the unknown death of the offerer terminates an offer would not be
consistent with this test. The average layman would be surprised to be told that he had
no contract if he advanced credit to a third person in reliance upon an offer for a unilateral contract of guaranty, because the offerer at a distance had died but a moment
before he advanced the credit. The law exists for laymen and should, so far as possible,
square itself to their understanding and not to the understanding of those prepossessed
by a theory of contracts. The measure of the practical objections to the rule in question
is the extent to which it disappoints men's reasonable expectations.
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in both cases is a large and a difficult question extending beyond
the purpose of the present discussion 2 5
HERMAN OLIPHANT.

Univermity of Chicago Law School.
6 See p. 204. n. s.

